Cargo 200 and Psychological Warfare in Ukraine

TLDR

Using Open Measures’ Telegram data related to the invasion of Ukraine, and as part of our bounty program previously outlined, we have performed an in-depth investigation into a form of emergent cross-platform propaganda surrounding the phrase “cargo 200.” Additionally, we are excited to use this opportunity to begin highlighting some of the network investigation and visualization technology we have been developing.

Background

Since Russia began the invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, both countries have been waging an information war in addition to the traditional war. It has been crucial for Russia and Ukraine to outwardly appear strong to keep the morale of their soldiers and citizens high. 

The majority of Russians are still in support of the invasion, but protests opposing the invasion have been widespread. This is especially significant for a country where speaking against the government can be dangerous. 

As a country with a population of 44 million and a GDP of $155.082 billion, compared to Russia’s population of 142 million and GDP of $1,702.361 billion, Ukraine is facing a more difficult challenge (via CIA World Factbook). They must not only keep the spirits of their countrymen high, but also gain support in Russia and other countries to stand a chance in this war.

To fight against the more populous and wealthy country, Ukrainians have been aggressively pursuing all possible avenues of support, from obtaining weapons from previously neutral countries to crowdsourcing a cyber offensive to attack critical Russian websites.

They have also been drawing sympathy for their cause while demonstrating that they have been doing a good job of defending against the invasion. The posting of dead Russian soldiers has provided proof to the world that Ukraine has been successfully defending their country. Days into the invasion, Putin had still not acknowledged that he had lost troops.

Caption: Alexey Nikolsky/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images.

After capturing or killing Russian soldiers, the Ukrainian government has been publicly posting images of the soldiers and their government-issued IDs. Ukraine is saying that they’re doing this to help Russian families find their loved ones, but this also helps them demonstrate that they have been successfully defending against the invasion.

One week into the invasion, Russia finally acknowledged that they had suffered loss of troops. It had become much more difficult for them to continue denying that they had suffered losses after photographs of deceased Russian soldiers began circulating over Twitter, Telegram, and other media platforms. 

Origins of the Phrase “Cargo 200”

In the USSR’s Order No. 200 during the the country's Soviet-Afghan War, a deceased soldier’s cargo weight was set at 200 kg. Since then, “Cargo 200” has been used to refer to deceased Russian soldiers by both opponents of Russia and the Russian military themselves. 

Caption: Excerpt from the Ministry of Defense of the USSR Order No. 200 (1984). Translation via DeepL.

For example, it was reported in 2018 that Russian vans bearing the words “Cargo 200” were crossing the Ukraine-Russia border during a conflict in Donetsk.

Caption: Maria Turchenkova/Echo Photo Agency.

Due to the term’s association with defeated Russian soldiers, the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs has been using “Cargo 200” for media accounts used to post the photographs and videos of KIA (killed in action) soldiers and POWs (prisoners of war).

Below is a graph displaying the frequency of the term “Груз 200” (Russian/Ukrainian for “Cargo 200”) on the messaging service Telegram in the past year.

Caption: Graph generated by the Open Measures’ Timeline analysis tool.

Platforms

With the goal of increasing morale in Ukraine and decreasing it in Russia by demonstrating military success, the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs created the Cargo 200 campaign. The campaign has primarily been gaining attention on Telegram, but they also have a website, a YouTube channel, and a Twitter account. Here’s a quick look at their various platforms.

Telegram

rf200_now

On Feb. 26, 2022, Виктор Андрусив (Victor Andrusiv) and other employees working for the Ministry of Internal Affairs created the “rf200_now” Telegram channel to share photographs and videos of Russian KIA soldiers and POWs. As of March 18, the channel has over 865,000 subscribers. The first post in the channel was on Feb. 26 at 12:30 GMT (below). It is a video of two POWs answering questions.

Caption: First post in the rf200_now Telegram. Screenshot: March 13, 2022, 22:05 PST.

Caption: Translated text of the first post. Translation via DeepL.

rf200_info_bot

Linked in the description of the rf200_now channel, the Telegram channel "rf200_info_bot" is a way to request information about POWs and KIAs. When you click on the channel link, the "/start" command is executed and a few lines are output with instructions on how to start using the bot. 

Caption: The "rf200_info_bot" Telegram channel. Screenshot: March 6, 2022, 22:28 PST.

Caption: Translated text of the bot instructions. Translation via DeepL.

After a name is provided, other information is requested, such as an email address, Viber, Telegram, or WhatsApp. The questions asked by the bot are similar to the ones asked on the Google Form linked on the 200rf.com site. 

Interestingly, the rf200_now channel reported attacks on the bot in the below post from March 8. 

Caption: rf200_now Telegram announcement about the attacks on the bot. Screenshot: March 17, 2022, 00:34 PST.

Caption: Translated text of the above announcement. Translation via DeepL.

Website

There is also a website with the domain name 200rf.com. It contains eight embedded YouTube videos, a link to the rf200_now Telegram channel, a Google Form, and an email address (info.russia.2022@gmail.com). Though some of the links on the site have been updated, they have not added additional embedded YouTube videos beyond the originals posted on Feb. 27. 

Caption: The 200rf.com site. Screenshot: March 10, 2022, 05:50 PST.

The website was first released on February 26, two days after the invasion began. From the Wayback Machine’s results for 200rf.com, we can see it was first archived on Feb. 26 at 18:37:22 GMT. 

Google Form

In the screen capture of the 200rf.com site, there is a button linking to a Google Form that Russians can fill out to request information about relatives who went to Ukraine. This is similar to the rf200_info_bot Telegram channel.

Caption: Google Form linked on the 200rf.com site. Screenshot: March 10, 2022, 05:58 PST.

Caption: Questions asked on the Google Form, as of 13 March 2022 16:27 PST. Translation via DeepL.

YouTube

The Cargo 200 YouTube is less active and less frequently followed than their Telegram, but as of March 18, they still have 5,640 subscribers and over two million total views on their videos. Their first video was posted on Feb. 27 at 18:50:30 UTC.

In that video, Виктор Андрусив (Victor Andrusiv), who is an advisor to Ukraine’s Minister of Internal Affairs, says that they created the 200rf.com website for Russian families to find their loved ones.

Caption: First video posted on the Cargo 200 YouTube. Pictured: Виктор Андрусив (Victor Andrusiv). Screenshot: March 13, 2022, 16:50 PST.

Caption: Video description of the first video. In the description, you can see the posted links for the other Cargo 200 platforms. Screenshot: March 13, 2022, 16:53 PST. 

Twitter

The Cargo 200 Twitter is also significantly less followed than the Telegram, with only ~2,500 followers as of March 13, 2022. They made their first post on Feb. 27, 2022, at 12:28 UTC. 

Caption: First post on the @rf_200_now Twitter. Screenshot on March 13, 2022, 17:32 PST.

Rather than posting incrementally, this account has been posting images and videos in big batches. For example, there were no posts from March 4-6, but dozens were posted on March 7. After that, no additional posts were made until March 12. This is very different from the Cargo 200 Telegram, where many posts are made each day.

Telegram Content and Narrative Analysis

With over 865,000 subscribers on Telegram and more than 800 posts, 50 of which have over 1,000,000 views each, the Ukrainian government has successfully created a far-reaching, carefully created campaign. However, the practice of uploading images and videos of POWs is controversial, with some arguing it is a violation of the Geneva Conventions.

Ukraine has been seeking to decrease the morale of Russian soldiers and citizens while encouraging surrender and civil unrest. They also are trying to gather sympathy and gratitude for the Ukrainian cause. In this section, we will examine how the Ukrainian government has used the Cargo 200 Telegram account to further these goals. 

Inspiring Fear in Russian Soldiers and Their Families

As a phrase originally used to refer to a dead Soviet soldier, Cargo 200 is terrifying for Russians — see the below Telegram post in the force3ua channel on March 7 for an example of Cargo 200 being used colloquially. 

Caption: Post in the force3ua Telegram channel. Screenshot: March 14, 2022, 03:33 PST.

Caption: Translation of the above post via DeepL (emphasis added).

As of March 16, the Cargo 200 Telegram has posted 634 photos and 321 videos. Though some of the posts are infographics and other invasion-related news, almost all are photos and videos of the Russian soldiers or their government-issued identification (if their bodies are unrecognizably damaged). 

The Cargo 200 Telegram account has posted dozens upon dozens of dead bodies to substantiate Ukrainian claims of significant Russian casualties, which cast doubt on Putin’s claims that he hadn't lost any soldiers. On March 2, one week into the invasion, Russia finally put out their first casualty estimates – 498 dead and 1,597 wounded.

Caption: Some of the first photos posted in the rf200_now Telegram channel.

The Cargo 200 Telegram has also been posting pictures of the Russian soldiers alive and happy before they were killed in the invasion. Seeing the soldiers as the young, whole men that they were helps Ukraine further villainize the Russian government for sending them to fight and die in Ukraine. 

Caption: Russian KIA soldiers posted in rf200_now on March 15.

Not many of the Russian soldiers have a cell phone with them in Ukraine, so they likely can’t see the Cargo 200 campaign; a significant number of Russians do have Telegram installed (61% according to a 2021 Deloitte survey), however, so they could view the rf200_now channel if they wanted.

The Russian government can attempt to block websites in Russia, but as long as Russians are allowed to use Telegram, the government cannot block specific channels like rf200_now. 

Incentives to Surrender

The Ukrainian government has offered five million rubles and full amnesty for Russian soldiers that surrender. In a Facebook post, Резніков Олексій (Oleksii Reznikov), the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, addressed the Russian soldiers and officers in a Facebook post on Feb. 28.

Below is an English translation of his post (which he provided):

Caption: The English translation that Oleksii Reznikov provided on his Feb. 28 Facebook post, encouraging Russians to surrender. Screenshot: March 14, 2022, 03:10 PST.

Caption: Image attached to Oleksii Reznikov’s Facebook post.

Caption: Oleksii Reznikov’s Facebook profile. Screenshot on March 15, 2022, 01:05 PST.

As further incentive to surrender, the Cargo 200 Telegram channel has been emphasizing that they treat their captives well. When the captive is injured, they are given hospital beds and bandages. Most of the captives also appear to not be bound with ropes or chains and are not in prison cells.

Caption: Videos of POWs posted in rf_200 on Feb. 26 (first and second images) and Feb. 27 (third image).

They also have been posting videos of the Russian soldiers calling their parents, which provides further indication that the captives are treated well and do not have to fear surrendering. This helps garner support for the Ukrainians too, because in these videos, they appear to be treating POWs of the invading, aggressor country with respect.

In the below video posted on the Cargo 200 Telegram, a POW calls his mother and cries when she says she wants him to come home. He tells her the entire battalion died and that she needs to contact the other mothers. He also says that the Russians are not properly taking care of the bodies of the fallen and are killing the wounded.

Caption: POW cries on the phone with mother. Screenshot on March 16, 2022, 23:50 PST.

Appealing to the Relatives of Russian Soldiers

In addition to giving the Russian POWs phone calls to family members, the Ukrainian government has also been actively offering to help Russian families who are seeking information about their relatives involved in the invasion. One way they have been doing this is by posting unit numbers of KIA or POW Russian soldiers.

Caption: Translation via DeepL of a rf200_now post containing a list of unit numbers.

The families of those sent to invade Ukraine are afraid, with one mother of a prisoner of war asking, “Whose door should I knock on to get my child back?” On March 3, the Ukrainian government told Russian mothers that they could come to Kiev to pick up their captured sons.

Usually POWs are exchanged, so the Ukrainians offering to freely give back POWs if their mothers came to pick them up can be read as a strategic move to make Russian families feel gratitude for Ukraine’s generosity. 

Caption: A post encouraging mothers to come to Ukraine to get their sons, posted on March 3, 2022.

Cross-Channel Analysis

The rf200_now channel operates in a diverse Telegram ecosystem of both pro-Ukraine and pro-Russia channels. This creates an opportunity for pro-Kremlin channels to dispute the content shared in rf200 in order to defend their side of the information war.

The opposite also occurs: We observed instances where pro-Ukraine channels re-amplified rf200 content in order to extend the reach of their mission. For this analysis, we analyzed Telegram channels related to the conflict with political stances labeled (pro-UA, pro-RU, etc.) in our public Google sheet.

We explore both of these situations using Open Measures’ real-time streaming network database of Telegram metadata. 

Russian Propaganda Channels Deny Losses

The popular pro-Russia disinformation channel "Warfakes", as reported on by DRFLab, has been disputing the legitimacy of the content posted in rf200_now.

In the below post on Feb. 26, Warfakes asserted that the reports that Russia had lost soldiers were false. Five days later, Putin would report that 498 Russian soldiers had been killed so far in the invasion.

Caption: Post in the Warfakes Telegram channel on Feb. 26, disputing the losses reported by the rf200_now channel. Screenshot: March 18, 2022, 15:02 PST.

Caption: Translation of the Warfakes post via DeepL.

Media Sharing

To begin, we investigated instances where the media originating from rf200_now spread into other Telegram channels. As mentioned above, the content shared in rf200_now is typically evidence of Russian soldiers who are POWs or KIA. 

Caption: Telegram rf200_now media propagation.

Using the metadata of political stance labels for each channel, we see that most instances of media sharing are across channels we don’t currently have labels for. The second largest instance are channels labeled as pro-UA (Ukraine). There is an instance where a piece of media content was shared in "chvkmedia", a pro-Kremlin political and military news aggregator channel.

Caption: The same media was shared across both pro-Kremlin and pro-UA Telegram channels. The screen capture on the right is a KIA soldier posted in rf200_now; on the left is the same photo, reposted and disputed in a pro-Kremlin channel.

Caption: Translation of the above post (left) via DeepL.

Other examples of media sharing include the dissemination of rf200 content by both pro-UA groups and weapons archival users. In addition to directly disputing media content, pro-Kremlin actors have spun up copycat channels attempting to misdirect those looking for the original rf200 channel. 

Caption: The screen capture on the left shows the channel invite page for the original rf200_now channel. The capture on the right shows a fake rf200_now channel, created by pro-Kremlin actors attempting to misdirect the narrative.

Link Sharing

We also used Open Measures’ emerging Network Graph tooling to investigate co-shared links that originated from rf200_now. Some examples of these are direct links to the rf200_now Telegram channel itself, to the rf200 website, or to their YouTube channel.

Using stance labels, we can see that messages containing these links were only forwarded to channels that are labeled as pro-UA or that did not have a label at all. Additional research is required to look into whether the unlabeled channels actually have a pro-Kremlin stance.

Caption: Telegram channel rf200_now's link propagation.

The figure above shows numbered clusters of messages that were forwarded or posted across channels which contain any links that also appeared in rf200_now. For example, message cluster #44 contains messages that contain “200rf.com." We can see that the ten Telegram channels that received these messages did not receive any messages containing any of the other links — in other words, their only reference to rf200_now was via the website link.

A similar situation is true of the channels in message cluster #6, which only received messages that contained a link to the rf200_now Telegram channel but did not contain messages with any other link. We suspect this is because the majority of these channels already have subscriber overlap with one another, making direct links to channels unnecessary unless sharing for the first time. We welcome additional research into this.

Conclusion

As the world enters new eras of online and offline warfare, the study of information warfare holds even greater importance. This blog post shows how Russia’s efforts to hide their KIA and POW numbers, alongside Ukraine’s efforts to expose them, has created a new vector of war.

This information war flourishes on fringe platforms like Telegram in ways that could be materially impacting the on-the-ground war. Using emerging technology, we can archive and understand this complex relationship between online and offline harm as well as ask deeper ethical questions about warfare in the modern era in the interest of reducing harm and promoting public safety. 

Resources

The majority of this research was conducted using Open Measures’ media server, Network Graph database, and public API. 

Please get in touch with us if you’d like to receive access to the media server, where researchers and journalists can sort through up-to-date images, videos, and other content from the frontlines of the war in Ukraine. We also hope to contribute to any archival efforts to document any ongoing war crimes.

Caption: Open Measures’ media server, showing results from rf200_now.

The public API makes it simple to query content from rf200_now or other channels mentioned in this article. 

Caption: Open Measures’ public API docs with parameters set to query rf200_now.

Lastly, Open Measures has begun building a Network Graph representation of all of our collected data, starting with Telegram. This graph allowed us to quickly find media and links shared by rf200_now across all of our Telegram collections.

We now have the ability to do similar analysis for other sites we crawl, including the Eastern European social networking service VK. This system will also give the native ability to build cross-platform relationships.

Other Resources

• https://www.deepl.com/en/translator

• https://citizenevidence.amnestyusa.org/

• https://archive.org/web/

• https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/